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In The Heart of Human Rights,1 Allen Buchanan emphasizes the distinction between moral human 
rights (MHRs) on the one hand and international legal human rights (ILHRs) on the other. MHRs 
are the moral rights held universally by all humans simply in virtue of being human. ILHRs are the 
legal rights of international practice, which are articulated in the United Nations’ International Bill 
of Rights and related legal documents. One of the most controversial aspects of Buchanan’s 
account of human rights is its denial of any significant role for MHRs in the justification of the 
content of ILHRs. This is at odds with the orthodoxy according to which there is a close 
connection between MHRs and ILHRs. In particular, Buchanan challenges what he calls the 
‘Mirroring View’ according to which each ILHR constitutes the reflection of some corresponding 
MHR. 
 
Buchanan is right to subject the Mirroring View to scrutiny, and although I agree that it should be 
rejected, in what follows I argue that his alternative account of the justification of ILHRs is also 
problematic. I argue that rejecting the Mirroring View does not entail the irrelevance of MHRs to 
the justification of the content of ILHRs, and I propose an alternative account that avoids the 
shortcomings of the Mirroring View while nevertheless placing MHRs at the core of the 
justification of ILHRs.  
 
1. Reflections on the Mirroring View 
According to the Mirroring View, the function of ILHRs is to give legal expression and force to 
antecedently existing MHRs. On this view, each ILHR is taken to be the reflection of some 
corresponding MHR. The reflection need not be perfect: Proponents of the Mirroring View accept 
that ILHRs can be context-sensitive, and therefore more detailed, specifications of MHRs. But 
even allowing for this, opponents of the Mirroring View argue that the content of MHRs is so 
narrow as to exclude some of the core content of ILHRs.2 According to its critics, the Mirroring 
 
1 Allen Buchanan, The Heart of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2013). All page numbers 
in brackets refer to this text.  
2 As we shall see, Buchanan makes this kind of argument. A similar argument is also advanced by 
Charles Beitz in The Idea of Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2009), pp. 66-67. 
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View therefore has unacceptably revisionary implications. In this vein, Buchanan argues that the 
Mirroring View should be rejected because it ‘cannot account for some prominent ILHRs that are 
appropriately included in the system’ (274), including the right to health, the right to democratic 
governance, and the right to freedom of expression (58-64). 
 
Before going on to consider whether this is in fact the case, it’s worth reflecting for a moment on 
why this would be damaging to the Mirroring View. It’s certainly not obvious that an account with 
highly revisionary implications for the practice should be rejected for that reason.  The kind of 
account of human rights that Buchanan intends to provide is meant to be normative and not 
merely descriptive. Why not, then, think that if the Mirroring View has highly revisionary 
implications for the practice, that is just so much the worse for the practice? If a theory of human 
rights is meant to be normative, then why should we be wedded to the actual content of the system 
as it currently exists? To reject the Mirroring View by arguing that it excludes some ILHRs that 
are appropriately included in the system at first glance appears to beg the question against the it 
by assuming precisely what it denies, namely that ILHRs can appropriately be included in the 
system despite not being justifiable with reference to corresponding MHRs. 
 
To see why Buchanan’s rejection of the Mirroring View is not question-begging, it helps to clarify 
the kind of project that he is engaged in. A central question Buchanan aims to answer is whether 
a system of ILHRs like the one that currently exists can be morally justified (67-68 and 85). This 
question is distinct from the question of whether the existing system of ILHRs in its current state is 
morally justifiable; but it is equally distinct from the question of what, if any, human rights norms 
would apply in an idealized conception of global justice. Answering the question of whether a 
system of ILHRs like the existing one can be morally justified requires an account of the system 
in question; but the task is not merely descriptive. The aim is to evaluate an idealized version of 
the existing system – not idealized based on external standards, but rather based on the ideals 
expressed by the system itself. The task is therefore an interpretive one. What makes for a 
successful interpretation of an institution or system is a difficult question, but it seems reasonable 
to suppose that an account of ILHRs that implies the exclusion of many or prominent rights from 
the existing system is unlikely to be recognizable as an account of that system, and therefore 
implausible as an interpretation of it. This brings us back to Buchanan’s claim that the Mirroring 
View excludes some prominent ILHRs and should therefore be rejected.   
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According to Buchanan, it is because MHRs must be ‘solely subject-grounded’ that they cannot 
alone account for the extensive content of ILHRs (59). On his view, in order to justify a right of 
any kind one must show that a duty is owed to a particular right-holder. That is to say that one 
must show that the alleged right-holder is entitled to the performance of the duty in question on 
the part of the alleged duty-bearer. In the case of moral rights, he argues, this involves identifying 
something about the alleged right-holder (usually an interest) that is sufficient to ground the 
directed duty. This is not necessary in the case of legal rights, presumably because the direction of 
the duty and the corresponding entitlement are already contained in the relevant legal doctrine. By 
contrast, moral rights must be solely subject-grounded, according to Buchanan, since we otherwise 
lack a reason to connect the performance of a particular duty with the entitlement of a right-holder.   
 
Because legal rights are not constrained by the requirement of being solely subject-grounded, they 
can have much more extensive content than moral rights. This, Buchanan argues, is true for a 
number of ILHRs. The ILHR to health, for example, entitles right-holders to provisions beyond 
what they could possibly claim solely on the basis of their individual interest in health. As 
Buchanan points out ‘protecting and promoting an individual’s interest in health will require large-
scale social investment for the provision of public goods’ whose cost and restrictions on liberty 
could not be justified by appeal to any single individual’s interest in health (61). It is only because 
the interests of many individuals can be positively affected that these costs and restrictions on 
liberty can be justified. He argues that the same holds for some other ILHRs including the right 
to democratic governance and freedom of expression. Because these and other ILHRs cannot be 
fully justified by appeal to corresponding MHRs on Buchanan’s account of what is required for 
MHRs to be justified, the Mirroring View would have the highly revisionary implication that the 
content of ILHRs should be radically scaled down.  
 
It’s not entirely clear that Buchanan’s worry is justified. If everyone has an interest in some good, 
then the fact that a single person’s interest in that good is not on its own sufficient to justify the 
imposition of corresponding duties on others appears to be beside the point. MHRs are meant to 
be grounded in interests that are held universally by all humans. It’s difficult to see how a situation 
could arise in which only one person has an interest in the kind of goods whose provision is 
required by, for example, the ILHR to health. If there is a right at all, there have to be duty-bearers; 
and if there are duty-bearers, then they too will have this interest (notwithstanding certain science 
fiction scenarios). But even if we could imagine a case in which only one person has the interest 
in question, it seems irrelevant to our current situation in which everyone has it.  
 4 
 
Regardless of my doubts about Buchanan’s argument, I agree with him that the content of MHRs 
is considerably narrower than that of ILHRs, and that the Mirroring View therefore has 
unacceptably revisionary implications. Whereas Buchanan thinks this is because MHRs must be 
solely subject-grounded, I think it is because MHRs are meant to be natural rights. MHRs are 
natural in the sense that they are held by all humans simply in virtue of being human, and not on 
account of any special relationships in which right holders stand to duty bearers.3 As such, they 
must be held by each and against all, and their corresponding duties are therefore owed by each 
and to all. MHRs, I argue, have narrower content than ILHRs because ILHRs include positive 
rights, and few, if any, positive rights can meet this requirement.4 Positive rights are those whose 
fulfilment requires action on the part of the relevant duty-bearers. They stand in contrast to 
negative rights whose fulfilment requires only omission. The objects of the positive rights 
articulated in the IBHR (e.g. subsistence, health care, education, and employment) cannot be 
claimed by each of us against all other moral agents since no moral agent alone could possibly 
provide these goods to all those in need of them. In order for these rights to be justified, 
institutional mechanisms must be in place to allocate specific duties to specific duty-bearers. But 
this means that the rights in question are in fact special, and therefore not natural, as MHRs are 
meant to be: They are held partly in virtue of the institutions that allocate specific duties to specific 
duty-bearers, and not simply in virtue of the humanity of the right-holders. If this is right, then the 
Mirroring View implies that the international human rights system should not include positive 
rights. Given the large number of positive rights articulated in the IBHR and related documents, 
the implications of Mirroring View are, then, so revisionary as to undermine its plausibility.  
 
2. Buchanan’s proposal  
Having rejected the Mirroring View, we are faced with the question of how ILHRs are in fact 
justified, and what, if any, relevance MHRs have. Buchanan proposes a ‘pluralistic justificatory 
strategy’ for ILHRs that puts MHRs almost completely out of the picture. Although he thinks that 
the best justification for a very few ILHRs will make reference to some corresponding MHR (159), 
in general he thinks that ILHRs are fully justified without any reference at all to MHRs. Rather 
 
3 See H. L. A. Hart, 1955, ‘Are There Any Natural Rights?’, The Philosophical Review 64 (2): 175-
191, p. 175. 
4 This line of argument is pressed by Onora O’Neill in 2005, ‘The Dark Side of Human Rights’, 
International Affairs 81(2): 427-439. It has been further developed elsewhere, for example in 
Simon Hope, 2014, ‘Kantian Imperfect Duties and Modern Debates over Human Rights’, Journal 
of Political Philosophy, 22(4): 396-415; and Jesse Tomalty, 2014, ‘The Force of the Claimability 
Objection to the Human Right to Subsistence’, Canadian Journal of Philosophy 44(1): 1-17. 
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than giving legal expression and force to MHRs, Buchanan argues that ILHRs have two functions: 
one is to protect and promote well-being; the other is to protect and promote equal status of 
persons (28-36). On Buchanan’s account, all that is required for the justification of an ILHR is (a) 
that it fulfils one of these functions, and (b) that it is reasonable to include such a right in 
international law. (It’s worth pointing out that Buchanan’s view would collapse into a version of 
the Mirroring View if it were the case that only the existence of a corresponding MHR could make 
it justifiable to include a right in international law; but Buchanan denies that this is the case. On 
his view, it can be justifiable to include human rights in international law regardless of whether a 
corresponding MHR can be justified.) 
 
Buchanan’s pluralistic justificatory strategy does better than the Mirroring View when it comes to 
accounting for the content of ILHRs in the practice, but I argue that in denying the relevance of 
MHRs to the justification of ILHRs, it sits awkwardly with the preambular language of core ILHR 
documents, which strongly suggests that the rights contained therein are intended to give legal 
expression and force to the rights held by all humans simply in virtue of being human. For 
example, according to the preamble of the Charter of the United Nations, one of the purposes of 
the institution of the United Nations is ‘to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights’. It doesn’t 
proclaim these rights or call for their enactment. It reaffirms faith in them.5 And this, of course, is 
prior to the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR), and so it can’t 
plausibly be understood as reaffirming faith in previously articulated legal human rights. Likewise, 
the preamble of the UDHR states that ‘recognition (…) of the equal and inalienable rights of all 
members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world (…)’. 
A natural reading of this passage suggests that the UDHR recognizes a set of moral rights that all 
humans already have. 
  
Buchanan anticipates this line of objection and dismisses it by arguing that, to the extent that 
international human rights practice has developed in ways that do not recognize the justificatory 
constraints of the Mirroring View, ‘such developments should be regarded as progressive, rather 
than degenerate’ (73). But while the practice may not recognize all of the strictures of the Mirroring 
View, it is far from clear that it has departed from the orthodox understanding of the function of 
 
5 See Carl Wellman, Moral Dimensions of Human Rights (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), p. 
5. 
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ILHRs as giving legal expression and force to MHRs.6 What Buchanan fails to consider is the 
possibility of an account of ILHRs that sees them as grounded in MHRs, but that does not thereby 
require that each ILHR constitutes the reflection of some corresponding MHR. I explore this 
possibility in the next section.  
 
Buchanan provides a strong case for thinking that a satisfactory justification for many, if not all, 
ILHRs can be given without appeal to corresponding MHRs.7 But what he fails to show is that his 
pluralistic justificatory strategy constitutes a better interpretation of the existing system than one 
that is more in line with the preambular language. It is, of course, unlikely that any interpretation 
could account for all of the elements of the system of ILHRs as it actually exists; but an 
interpretation that can account for more of the core elements of the system will be a better 
interpretation than one that cannot – and the idea that ILHRs are grounded in MHRs is surely a 
core element of the system. The plausibility of my claim that both the Mirroring View and 
Buchanan’s alternative should be rejected therefore hinges on the availability of a theory that does 
better than both at accounting for the core elements of the system of ILHRs. I think that such a 
theory is available.   
 
3. A better alternative? 
I have argued so far that neither the Mirroring View nor Buchanan’s alternative provide plausible 
interpretations of the existing system of ILHRs. The Mirroring View has overly revisionary 
implications for the content of ILHRs, while Buchanan’s alternative doesn’t capture the spirit of 
the international human rights enterprise expressed in the preambular language of core ILHR 
documents. A better alternative would be one that could both account for the actual content of 
ILHRs while preserving the idea that MHRs are at the heart of the enterprise. In what follows, I 
sketch an account that promises to meet these conditions.    
 
Contrary to Buchanan, I think the Mirroring View gets the function of ILHRs right. ILHRs should 
be seen as giving legal expression and force to MHRs. However, contrary to what is suggested by 
the Mirroring View, this does not entail that each ILHR must reflect the content of an MHR. 
While some ILHRs can be seen as giving both expression and force to corresponding MHRs, 
others may give them force but not expression. ILHRs can give legal force to MHRs through the 
 
6 See, for example, Maglosia Fitzmaurice, ‘Interpretation of Human Rights Treaties’, in The 
Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights Law, edited by Dinah Shelton (Oxford University 
Press, 2013), pp. 739-771. 
7 See especially pp. 158-171.  
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institution of rights that indirectly protect and promote MHRs. While the Mirroring View supports 
a kind of one-to-one mapping of MHRs to ILHRs, my proposed alternative allows for the indirect 
derivation of some ILHRs from MHRs. This view finds support in the preambles of the 
International Covenants, according to which ‘the ideal of free human beings enjoying freedom 
from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy 
his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights (…)’.  
 
The idea of the enjoyment of rights is developed by Henry Shue in his influential work on human 
rights.8 According to Shue, in order for the substance of a right to be enjoyed, the right-holder 
must have reasonable guarantees that the object of their right will be protected against standard 
threats. Enjoyment of a right therefore requires more than its non-violation. It requires that there 
are guarantees in place that the right will not be violated. Providing such guarantees involves 
reducing right-holders’ vulnerability across multiple dimensions. For example, the enjoyment of 
MHRs requires that an effective and fair judicial system is in place. Furthermore, it requires that 
people are adequately well-off and well-educated to be able to navigate these and other social 
systems.  
 
These kinds of so-called ‘linkages’ between the enjoyment of MHRs and the institutionalization of 
other rights strongly suggest that something like the extensive list of ILHRs could be justified by 
appeal to the mandate of international human rights law to promote the enjoyment of MHRs, 
even where MHRs are taken to have quite narrow content. This is because enjoyment of MHRs 
necessitates the institution of other rights. These other rights can reasonably be included among 
ILHRs even though they don’t correspond directly to any particular MHR, given that we 
understand the point of ILHRs to be the promotion of the enjoyment of MHRs and not just their 
articulation in law.   
 
This is merely a sketch of an alternative account of ILHRs, but it is well worth further exploration. 
This is because, if borne out, it would have the advantage over the Mirroring View of being able 
to account for much of the content of the existing system of ILHRs, as well as the advantage over 
Buchanan’s account of maintaining a strong connection between MHRs and ILHRs, thus keeping 
in line with the preambular language of ILHR documents.  
 
 
8 Henry Shue, Basic Rights: Subsistence, Affluence, and U.S. Foreign Policy, 2nd Edition (Princeton 
University Press, 1996).  
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